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Next generation security with Self Sovereign Identity (SSI)
Written with Vikas Malhotra for WOPLLI: why centrally held digital identity is a security problem in itself, and how a decentralised model changes what a breach can take.
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Deepayan Chanda and Vikas Malhotra examine the security and privacy problems of centrally issued digital identities and propose self-sovereign identity (SSI) as the alternative. Their central claim is that decentralised, owner-controlled identity addresses many present-day security issues, starting with the risk of personal data gathered in one place.
The article starts with traditional identity documents such as licences and passports, issued by central authorities that keep their own records. Digital IDs grew from the need to verify these online. The authors acknowledge their benefits, including two-factor and biometric authentication, faster verification, better delivery of government programs, and remote proof of identity that need not expose details such as a date of birth.
They then set out the flaws. Systems built on so much personal data can create bias and exclusion, especially with facial recognition, and enrolment errors can produce duplicate identities that hamper access to benefits. One much-debated concern is that central storage forms one large, data-rich target. Some also cite government surveillance, which has held back adoption.
Under SSI, people and organisations hold their own identity for life and decide who sees all of it, part of it or a single attribute. Three parties are involved: the issuer, who decides what credential to issue, to whom and how it is verified; the owner, who presents all or part of it for services; and the verifier, who handles verification, including which issuers to trust, so service providers need not check or keep personal data. Privacy is the foundation of the design.
SSI improves security, the authors argue, by removing the central data stores that attackers target, while cryptography protects identity data. As data is distributed and encrypted, one compromise exposes only part of one user’s information. Owners also gain “selective disclosure”, sharing only what a purpose requires, such as proving they are over 18 without giving a birth date. Digital signatures and decentralised identifiers (DIDs) confirm authenticity.
The authors conclude that SSI offers answers to many current security problems. Owners control their identity more closely, reveal only the attributes a task needs and prove who they are cryptographically, which makes online dealings more trustworthy.
The shape of the argument.
Held centrally
One store. One breach reaches everyone in it.
Held by the person
No central store. A breach reaches one person's record, and only what was shared.